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Abstract
Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the
Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign
children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ
(variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency
gains. The first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assign-
ment procedures typically impede a student to submit a preference list that contains
all his acceptable schools. We study the preference revelation game where students
can only declare up to a fixed number of schools to be acceptable. We focus on
the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our main results identify rather
stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guarantee stability.
This stands in sharp contrast with the Boston mechanism which yields stable Nash
equilibrium outcomes. Hence, the transition to any of the two mechanisms while
keeping a restriction on the submittable preference lists may cause lower priority
students to occupy more preferred schools.
JEL classification: C72, C78, D78, I20
Keywords: school choice, matching, Nash equilibrium, stability, Gale-Shapley de-
ferred acceptance algorithm, top trading cycles, Boston mechanism, acyclic priority
structure, truncation
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1 Introduction
School choice is referred in the literature on education as giving parents a say in the
choice of the schools their children will attend. A recent paper by Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez (2003) has lead to an upsurge of enthusiasm in the use of matching theory for
the design and study of school choice mechanisms.1 Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003)
discuss critical flaws of the current procedures of some school districts in the US to assign
children to public schools, pointing out that the widely used Boston mechanism has the
serious shortcoming that it is not in the parents’ best interest to reveal their true pref-
erences. Using a mechanism design approach, they propose and analyze two alternative
student assignment mechanisms that do not have this shortcoming: the Student-Optimal
Stable mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles mechanism.
Since real-life school choice situations typically involve a large number of participants
and a relatively small number of school programs, parents are often asked to submit a
preference list containing only a limited number of schools.2 This restriction is reason for
concern, for complete revelation of one’s true preferences is typically no longer an option in
this case. In other words, the argument that the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism and
the Top Trading Cycles mechanism are strategy-proof is no longer valid. Imposing a curb
on the length of the submitted lists, though certainly having the merit of “simplifying”
matters, has the perverse effect of forcing participants to not be truthful, and eventually
compel them to adopt a strategic behavior when choosing which ordered list to submit. We
are then back in the situation of the Boston mechanism where participants are forced to
play a complicated admissions game. Participants may adopt strategic behavior because
the “quantitative” effect (i.e., participants cannot reveal their complete preference lists)
is likely to have a “qualitative” effect (i.e., participants may self-select by not declaring
their most preferred options). For instance, if a participant fears rejection by his most
preferred programs, it can be advantageous not to apply to these programs and use instead
its allowed application slots for less preferred programs.
The goal of this paper is to explore the effects of imposing a quota (i.e., a maximal
length) on the submittable preference lists of students. Thereby we revive an issue that
1Recent papers include Abdulkadirog˘lu (2005), Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth (2005), Abdulka-
dirog˘lu, Pathak, Roth, and So¨nmez (2005), Chen and So¨nmez (2006), Erdil and Ergin (2006), Ergin and
So¨nmez (2006), Kesten (2005), and Pathak and So¨nmez (2006).
2For instance, in the school district of New York City each year more than 90,000 students are assigned
to about 500 school programs, and parents are asked to submit a preference list containing at most 12
school programs.
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was initially discussed by Romero-Medina (1998).3 To this end, we study school choice
problems (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003) where a number of students has to be
assigned to a number of schools, each of which has a limited seat capacity. Students
have preferences over schools and remaining unassigned and schools have exogenously
given priority rankings over students.4 We introduce a preference revelation game where
students can only declare up to a fixed number (the quota) of schools to be acceptable.
Each possible quota, from 1 up to the total number of schools, together with a student
assignment mechanism induces a strategic “quota-game.” Since the presence of the quota
eliminates the existence of a dominant strategy when the mechanism at hand is the
Student-Optimal Stable or Top Trading Cycles mechanism, we focus our analysis on the
Nash equilibria of the quota-games. Regarding the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism,
our approach nicely complements the work of Roth (1984a), Gale and Sotomayor (1985a),
and Alcalde (1996) who characterized the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes when the
schools are strategic.5 As for the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, so far little has been
known about the structure of the set of Nash equilibria.
For all three mechanisms and for any quota, Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist.
For the Boston mechanism this follows from a straightforward extension of a result due to
Ergin and So¨nmez (2006), whereas for Student-Optimal Stable mechanism the existence
of Nash equilibria in pure strategies was already established by Romero-Medina (1998).
3To the best of our knowledge, Romero-Medina (1998) is the only paper that explicitly analyzes
restrictions on the length of submittable preference lists in the same setting. He focuses exclusively on
the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism and establishes that the correspondence of stable matchings is
implemented in Nash equilibria, independently of the quota (Romero-Medina, 1998, Theorem 7). While
we show that any stable matching can be sustained at some Nash equilibrium (Proposition 6.2), Nash
equilibria can also yield unstable matchings (Example 6.3). A recent paper by Kojima and Pathak (2006)
takes a statistical approach to study manipulations by schools in the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism
with restrictions on the length of submittable preference lists of schools.
4Very often local or state laws determine the priority rankings. Typically, students who live closer to
a school or have siblings attending a school have higher priority to be admitted at the school. In other
situations, priority rankings may be determined by one or several entrance exams. Then students who
achieve higher test scores in the entrance exam of a school have higher priority for admission at the school
than students with lower test scores.
5Roth (1984a) and Gale and Sotomayor (1985a) characterized the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes
when schools are strategic agents in a college admission problem, assuming that students truthfully reveal
their (whole) preferences. In particular, they showed that Nash equilibria yield stable matchings and that
any stable matching can be obtained as a Nash equilibrium outcome. Alcalde (1996) went one step further
assuming that students may not necessarily use their weakly dominant strategy. He showed that the set
of Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of individually rational matchings.
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We also establish that the associated quota-games have a common feature: the equilibria
are nested with respect to the quota. More precisely, given a quota, any Nash equilibrium
is also a Nash equilibrium under any less stringent quota. This leads to the following im-
portant observation: If a Nash equilibrium outcome in a quota-game has an undesirable
property then this is not simply due to the presence of a constraint on the size of sub-
mittable lists. Regarding the Boston and the Top Trading Cycle mechanism, we obtain a
much stronger result: Nash equilibrium outcomes are independent of the quota. This is
a powerful result, since it allows us to reduce the analysis to games of quota 1. Besides,
existence of a Nash equilibrium for the Top Trading Cycles mechanism easily follows from
this result and the strategy-proofness in the unconstrained setting.
Stability is the central concept in the two-sided matching literature and does not lose
its importance in the closely related model of school choice.6 Loosely speaking, stability
of an assignment obtains when, for any student, all the schools he prefers to the one
he is assigned to have exhausted their capacity with students that have higher priority.
Hence, stability corresponds to a fairness rationale in the context of school choice: if an
assignment is not stable then some student prefers a seat that is either unfilled or filled
by a student with a lower priority. Regarding the Boston mechanism, it is easy to show
that the correspondence of stable matchings is implemented in Nash equilibria. The equi-
librium analysis turns out to be quite different for the other two mechanisms: under both
mechanisms there can be unstable Nash equilibrium outcomes. In fact, we exhibit a school
choice problem with a (strong) Nash equilibrium in (undominated) truncation strategies7
that yields an unstable matching. Yet, the two mechanisms are different in another aspect:
unlike the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, under the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism
any stable matching can be sustained at some Nash equilibrium, independently of the
quota. We show that stability of Nash equilibrium outcomes is guaranteed if and only if
schools’ priorities satisfy Ergin’s (2002) and Kesten’s (2006) acyclicity conditions, for the
Student-Optimal Stable mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, respectively.
This is quite surprising in light of Ergin’s (2002) result that his acyclicity condition is nec-
essary and sufficient for the Pareto-efficiency of the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism,
and Kesten’s (2006) result that his acyclicity condition is necessary and sufficient for the
stability of the Top Trading Cycles mechanism.
6In many centralized labor markets, clearinghouses are most often successful if they produce stable
matchings —see Roth (2002) and the references therein.
7A truncation strategy is a list obtained from the true preferences by omitting a “tail,” i.e., leaving
out one particular school and all less preferred schools.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the model of
school choice. In Section 3, we describe the three mechanisms and provide an illustrative
example. In Section 4, we introduce the strategic game induced by the imposition of a
quota on the revealed preferences. In Sections 5, 6, and 7, we present our results on the
existence, nestedness, and stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes for the quota-game
under the Boston, Student-Optimal Stable, and Top Trading Cycles mechanism, respec-
tively. In Section 8, we study Nash equilibria in undominated truncation strategies for
the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles mechanism. Finally,
in Section 9, we discuss the policy implications of our results and our contribution to the
literature on school choice. All proofs are relegated to the Appendices.
2 School Choice
Following Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) we define a school choice problem by a set
of schools and a set of students, each of which has to be assigned a seat at not more than
one of the schools. Each student is assumed to have strict preferences over the schools
and the option of remaining unassigned. Each school is endowed with a strict priority
ordering over the students and a fixed capacity of seats. Formally, a school choice problem
is a 5-tuple (I, S, q, P, f) that consists of
1. a set of students I = {i1, . . . , in},
2. a set of schools S = {s1, . . . , sm},
3. a capacity vector q = (qs1 , . . . , qsm),
4. a profile of strict student preferences P = (Pi1 , . . . , Pin), and
5. a strict priority structure of the schools over the students f = (fs1 , . . . , fsm).
We denote by i and s a generic student and a generic school, respectively. An agent
is an element of V := I ∪ S. A generic agent is denoted by v. With a slight abuse of
notation we write v for singletons {v} ⊆ V .
The preference relation Pi of student i is a linear order over S ∪ i, where i denotes
his outside option (e.g., going to a private school). Student i prefers school s to school
s′ if sPis′. School s is acceptable to i if sPii. Henceforth, when describing a particular
preference relation of a student we will only represent acceptable schools. For instance,
Pi = s, s
′ means that student i’s most preferred school is s, his second best s′, and any
other school is unacceptable. For the sake of convenience, if all schools are unacceptable
for i then we sometimes write Pi = i instead of Pi = ∅. Let Ri denote the weak preference
relation associated with the preference relation Pi.
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The priority ordering fs of school s assigns ranks to students according to their priority
for school s. The rank of student i for school s is fs(i). Then, fs(i) < fs(j) means that
student i has higher priority (or lower rank) for school s than student j. For s ∈ S and
i ∈ I, we denote by U fs (i) the set of students that have higher priority than student i for
school s, i.e., U fs (i) = {j ∈ I : fs(j) < fs(i)}.
Throughout the paper we fix the set of students I and the set of schools S. Hence, a
school choice problem is given by a triple (P, f, q), and simply by P when no confusion is
possible.
School choice is closely related to the college admissions model (Gale and Shap-
ley, 1962). The only but key difference between the two models is that in school choice
schools are mere “objects” to be consumed by students, whereas in the college admissions
model (or more generally, in two-sided matching) both sides of the market are agents with
preferences over the other side. In other words, a college admissions problem is given by
1–4 above and 5’ below:
5’. a profile of strict school preferences PS = (Ps1 , . . . , Psm),
where Ps denotes the strict preference relation of school s ∈ S over the students.
Priority orderings in school choice can be reinterpreted as school preferences in the
college admissions model. Therefore, many results or concepts for the college admissions
model have their natural counterpart for school choice.8 In particular, an outcome of a
school choice or college admissions problem is a matching µ : I ∪ S → 2I ∪ S such that
for any i ∈ I and any s ∈ S,
• µ(i) ∈ S ∪ i,
• µ(s) ∈ 2I ,
• µ(i) = s if and only if i ∈ µ(s), and
• |µ(s)| ≤ qs.
For v ∈ V , we call µ(v) agent v’s allotment. For i ∈ I, if µ(i) = s ∈ S then student
i is assigned a seat at school s under µ. If µ(i) = i then student i is unassigned under
µ.9 For convenience we often write a matching as a collection of sets. For instance,
µ = {{i1, i2, s1}, {i3}, {i4, s2}} denotes the matching in which students i1 and i2 each are
assigned a seat at school s1, student i3 is unassigned, and student i4 is assigned a seat at
school s2.
8See, for instance, Balinski and So¨nmez (1999).
9Education at the primary level, affirmed as a human right in the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, is compulsory in most countries. One of our results is that in equilibrium no student is
unassigned if there is a vacant seat at some acceptable school.
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A key property of matchings in the two-sided matching literature is stability. In-
formally, a matching is stable if, for any student, all the schools he prefers to the one
he is assigned to have exhausted their capacity with students that have higher priority.
Formally, let P be a school choice problem. A matching µ is stable if
• it is individually rational, i.e., for all i ∈ I, µ(i)Ri i,
• it is non wasteful (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999), i.e., for all i ∈ I and all s ∈ S,
sPiµ(i) implies |µ(s)| = qs, and
• there is no justified envy, i.e., for all i, j ∈ I with µ(j) = s ∈ S, sPiµ(i) implies
fs(j) < fs(i).
We denote the set of individually rational matchings by IR(P ), the set of non wasteful
matchings by NW (P ), and the set of stable matchings by S(P ).
Another desirable property for a matching is Pareto-efficiency. In the context of school
choice, the schools are mere “objects.” Therefore, to determine whether a matching
is Pareto-efficient we only take into account students’ welfare. A matching µ′ Pareto
dominates a matching µ if all students prefer µ′ to µ and there is at least one student that
strictly prefers µ′ to µ. Formally, µ′ Pareto dominates µ if µ′(i)Riµ(i) for all i ∈ I, and
µ′(i′)Pi′µ(i′) for some i′ ∈ I. A matching is Pareto-efficient if it is not Pareto dominated
by any other matching.
A (student assignment) mechanism systematically selects a matching for each school
choice problem. A mechanism is individually rational if it always selects an individually
rational matching. Similarly, one can speak of non wasteful, stable, or Pareto-efficient
mechanisms. Finally, a mechanism is strategy-proof if no student can ever benefit by
unilaterally misrepresenting his preferences.10
3 Three Competing Mechanisms
In this section we describe the mechanisms that we study in the context of constrained
school choice: the Boston mechanism, the Gale-Shapley Student-Optimal Stable mecha-
nism, and the Top Trading Cycles mechanism. The three mechanisms are direct mecha-
nisms, i.e., students only need to report an ordered list of their acceptable schools. For a
profile of revealed preferences the matching that is selected by a mechanism is computed
via an algorithm. Below we give a description of the three algorithms. Let (I, S, q, P, f)
be a school choice problem.
10In game theoretic terms, a mechanism is strategy-proof if truthful preference revelation is a weakly
dominant strategy.
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3.1 The Boston Algorithm
The Boston algorithm was first described in the literature by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez
(2003). Consider a profile of ordered lists Q submitted by the students. The Boston
algorithm finds a matching through the following steps.
Step 1: Set q1s := qs for all s ∈ S. Each student i proposes to the school that is ranked
first in Qi (if there is no such school then i remains unassigned). Each school s assigns
up to q1s seats to its proposers one at a time following the priority order fs. Remaining
students are rejected. Let q2s denote the number of available seats at school s. If q
2
s = 0
then school s is removed.
Step l, l ≥ 2: Each student i that is rejected in Step l − 1 proposes to the next school
in the ordered list Qi (if there is no such school then i remains unassigned). School s
assigns up to qls seats to its (new) proposers one at a time following the priority order fs.
Remaining students are rejected. Let qls denote the number of available seats at school s.
If qls = 0 then school s is removed.
The algorithm stops when no student is rejected or all schools have been removed. Any
remaining student remains unassigned. Let β(Q) denote the matching. The mechanism
β is the Boston mechanism. It is well known that the Boston mechanism is individually
rational, non wasteful, and Pareto-efficient. It is, however, neither stable nor strategy-
proof.
3.2 The Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) Algorithm
The deferred acceptance algorithm was introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). Let Q be
a profile of ordered lists submitted by the students. The DA algorithm finds a matching
through the following steps.
Step 1: Each student i proposes to the school that is ranked first in Qi (if there is no
such school then i remains unassigned). Each school s tentatively assigns up to qs seats
to its proposers one at a time following the priority order fs. Remaining students are
rejected.
Step l, l ≥ 2: Each student i that is rejected in Step l − 1 proposes to the next school
in the ordered list Qi (if there is no such school then i remains unassigned). Each school
s considers the new proposers and the students that have a (tentative) seat at s. School
s tentatively assigns up to qs seats to these students one at a time following the priority
order fs. Remaining students are rejected.
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The algorithm stops when no student is rejected. Each student is assigned to his final
tentative school. Let γ(Q) denote the matching. The mechanism γ is the Student-Optimal
Stable mechanism. The Student-Optimal Stable mechanism is a stable mechanism that
is Pareto superior to any other stable matching mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962).
An additional important property of the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism is that it
is strategy-proof (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982b). However, it is not Pareto-
efficient.
3.3 The Top Trading Cycles (TTC) Algorithm
The Top Trading Cycles mechanism in the context of school choice was introduced by
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003).11 Let Q be a profile of ordered lists submitted by
the students. The TTC algorithm finds a matching through the following steps.
Step 1: Set q1s := qs for all s ∈ S. Each student i points to the school that is ranked
first in Qi (if there is no such school then i points to himself, i.e., he forms a self-cycle).
Each school s points to the student that has the highest priority in fs. There is at least
one cycle. If a student is in a cycle he is assigned a seat at the school he points to (or to
himself if he is in a self-cycle). Students that are assigned are removed. If a school s is
in a cycle and q1s = 1, then the school is removed. If a school s is in a cycle and q
1
s > 1,
then the school is not removed and its capacity becomes q2s := q
1
s − 1.
Step l, l ≥ 2: Each student i that is rejected in Step l − 1 points to the next school in
the ordered list Qi that has not been removed at some step r, r < l, or points to himself
if there is no such school. Each school s points to the student with the highest priority
in fs among the students that have not been removed at a step r, r < l. There is at least
one cycle. If a student is in a cycle he is assigned a seat at the school he points to (or to
himself if he is in a self-cycle). Students that are assigned are removed. If a school s is
in a cycle and qls = 1, then the school is removed. If a school s is in a cycle and q
l
s > 1,
then the school is not removed and its capacity becomes ql+1s := q
l
s − 1.
The algorithm stops when all students or all schools have been removed. Any remaining
student is assigned to himself. Let τ(Q) denote the matching. The mechanism τ is the Top
Trading Cycles mechanism. The Top Trading Cycles mechanism is a Pareto-efficient and
11The Top Trading Cycles mechanism was inspired by Gale’s Top Trading Cycles algorithm which was
used by Roth and Postlewaite (1977) to obtain the unique core allocation for housing markets (Shapley
and Scarf, 1974). A variant of the Top Trading Cycles mechanism was introduced by Abdulkadirog˘lu
and So¨nmez (1999) for a model of house allocation with existing tenants.
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strategy-proof mechanism (see Roth, 1982a, for a proof in the context of housing markets
and Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003, for a proof in the context of school choice). The
mechanism is also individually rational and non wasteful. However, it is not stable.
3.4 An Illustrative Example
We illustrate the working of the three mechanisms in the following example.
Let I = {i1, i2, i3, i4} be the set of students, S = {s1, s2, s3} be the set of schools,
and q = (1, 2, 1) be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority
structure f are given in the table below. So, for instance, Pi1 = s2, s1 and fs1(i1) <
fs1(i2) < fs1(i3) < fs1(i4).
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4 fs1 fs2 fs3
s2 s1 s1 s2 i1 i3 i4
s1 s2 s2 s3 i2 i4 i1
s3 s1 i3 i1 i2
i4 i2 i3
If the students truthfully report their preference lists, then the mechanisms yield the
following matchings.
The Boston mechanism.
Step 1. Each student proposes to his most preferred school. So, school s1 receives a
proposal from i2 and i3. Student i2 has a higher priority, so i3’s proposal is rejected and
i2 is assigned the unique seat at s1. School s2 receives a proposal from i1 and i4. Since
school s2 has 2 seats each of the students i1 and i4 is assigned a seat at s2. Schools
s1 and s2 have filled all their seats and hence are removed. The tentative matching is
{{s1, i2}, {s2, i1, i4}, {s3}, {i3}} .
Step 2. Student i3 cannot propose to his next preferred school, s2. Since he finds school
s3 unacceptable he is removed and remains unassigned. So, the final matching is given by
β(P ) = {{s1, i2}, {s2, i1, i4}, {s3}, {i3}} .
The Student-Optimal Stable mechanism.
Step 1. Each student proposes to his most preferred school. So, school s1 receives a
proposal from i2 and i3. Student i2 has a higher priority, so i3’s proposal is rejected.
School s2 receives a proposal from i1 and i4. Since school s2 has 2 seats it does not reject
any of the two students. The tentative matching is {{s1, i2}, {s2, i1, i4}, {s3}, {i3}} .
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Step 2. Student i3 proposes to school s2. So, now school s2 has two (tentatively)
accepted students, i1 and i4, and one new proposal, from i3. Since school s2 has 2
seats it rejects i1, the student with the lowest priority. The tentative matching becomes
{{s1, i2}, {s2, i3, i4}, {s3}, {i1}} .
Step 3. Student i1 proposes to school s1. The unique seat of school s1 is tentatively
occupied by i2. Since i1 has a higher priority than student i2, the latter is rejected. The
tentative matching becomes {{s1, i1}, {s2, i3, i4}, {s3}, {i2}} .
Step 4. Student i2 proposes to school s3. Since school s3’s unique seat is available, student
i2 is accepted. No student has been rejected in this step, so the tentative matching is the
final matching and is given by
γ(P ) = {{s1, i1}, {s2, i3, i4}, {s3, i2}} .
The Top Trading Cycles mechanism.
Step 1. Each student points to his most preferred school, and each school points to
the student with highest priority. There is a unique cycle that is given by (i1, s2, i3, s1).
So, students i1 and i3 are assigned a seat at schools s2 and s1, respectively. Students i1
and i3 are removed. Since school s1 had only 1 available seat it is also removed. School
s2 still has an available seat and is therefore not removed. The tentative matching is
{{s1, i3}, {s2, i1}, {s3}, {i2}, {i4}} .
Step 2. There is a unique cycle given by (i4, s2). So, student i4 is assigned the remaining
seat at school s2. Both student i4 and school s2 are removed. The tentative matching is
{{s1, i3}, {s2, i1, i4}, {s3}, {i2}} .
Step 3. Only student i2 and school s3 remain. Since i2 finds school s3 acceptable, he
points to the school. Since i2 is the only remaining student, school s3 points to i2. This
creates a cycle and hence i2 is assigned a seat at school s3. So, the final matching is
τ(P ) = {{s1, i3}, {s2, i1, i4}, {s3, i2}} .
Note that for the school choice problem above the three mechanisms generate different
matchings. Also, the obtained matchings illustrate directly some of the “problems” of the
mechanisms. For instance, β(P ) is Pareto-efficient but not stable because student i3 has
justified envy with respect to school s2 and any of the students that occupy a seat. In fact,
one readily sees that β is not strategy-proof. (Had student i3 have announced the list that
only contains school s2 he would have guaranteed a seat at this school.) Similarly, one
easily verifies that γ(P ) is stable but not Pareto-efficient and that τ(P ) is Pareto-efficient
but not stable. More importantly, note that if in a direct revelation game under γ or τ
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students could only submit a list of 2 schools, student i2 would remain unassigned (and
the other students unaffected), provided that each student submits the list with his two
most preferred schools. Therefore, if students can only submit short preference lists, then
(at least) student i2 ought to strategize to ensure a seat at some (acceptable) school.
4 Constrained Preference Revelation
Fix the priority ordering f and the capacities q. We consider the following school
choice procedure. Students are asked to submit (simultaneously) preference lists Q =
(Qi1 , . . . , Qin) of “length” at most k (i.e., preference lists with at most k acceptable
schools). Here, k is a positive integer, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, and is called the quota. Subsequently,
a mechanism ϕ is used to obtain the matching ϕ(Q) and for all i ∈ I, student i is assigned
a seat at school ϕ(Q)(i).
Clearly, the above procedure induces a strategic form game, the quota-game Γϕ(P, k) :=
〈I,Q(k)I , P 〉. The set of players is the set of students I. The strategy set of each stu-
dent is the set of preference lists with at most k acceptable schools and is denoted by
Q(k). Let Q := Q(m). Outcomes of the game are evaluated through the true preferences
P = (Pi1 , . . . , Pin), where with some abuse of notation P denotes the straightforward ex-
tension of the preference relation over schools (and the option of remaining unassigned) to
matchings. That is, for all i ∈ I and matchings µ and µ′, µPiµ′ if and only if µ(i)Piµ′(i).
For any profile of preferences Q ∈ QI and any i ∈ I, we write Q−i for the profile of
preferences that is obtained from Q after leaving out preferences Qi of student i. A profile
of submitted preference lists Q ∈ Q(k)I is a Nash equilibrium of the game Γϕ(P, k) (or
k-Nash equilibrium for short) if for all i ∈ I and all Q′i ∈ Q(k), ϕ(Qi, Q−i)Riϕ(Q′i, Q−i).
Let Eϕ(P, k) denote the set of k-Nash equilibria. Let Oϕ(P, k) denote the set of k-Nash
equilibrium outcomes, i.e., Oϕ(P, k) := {ϕ(Q) : Q ∈ Eϕ(P, k)}.
Remark 4.1 Setting the same quota for all students is without loss of generality since
in the proofs we never compare the values of the quota for different students. For the
Student-Optimal Stable mechanism we will see that giving some students a higher quota
can only expand the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes with unstable matchings (Proposi-
tion 6.4 and Theorem 6.5). As for the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, we will see that the
set of Nash equilibrium outcomes does not vary with the quota (Theorem 7.2). Therefore,
our implementation results imply that giving students different quotas cannot serve as a
policy device to favor some students.
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5 Boston Mechanism
Our first result, which will serve as a benchmark for the other two mechanisms, states
that the Boston mechanism implements the set of stable matchings, independently of
the quota. Note that since the set of stable matchings is always non empty (Gale and
Shapley, 1962), the existence of Nash equilibria follows directly from this implementation
result.
Theorem 5.1 For any school choice problem P and any quota k, the game Γβ(P, k)
implements S(P ) in Nash equilibria, i.e., Oβ(P, k) = S(P ).
This result is obtained through a straightforward adaptation of the proof of Theorem 1
in Ergin and So¨nmez (2006). Its proof is therefore omitted.
6 Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism
We first establish the existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies when the Student-
Optimal Stable mechanism is used.
Theorem 6.1 For any school choice problem P and any quota k, Eγ(P, k) 6= ∅.
Theorem 6.1 is actually a direct corollary to the next result, which says that stable
matchings can always be obtained as equilibrium outcomes, for any value of the quota.
Proposition 6.2 (Romero-Medina, 1998, Theorem 7) For any school choice problem P
and any quota k, S(P ) ⊆ Oγ(P, k).
One may wonder whether the converse of Proposition 6.2 holds, i.e., whether each
Nash equilibrium induces a stable matching. As the following example shows, this is not
the case.
Example 6.3 An Unstable Nash Equilibrium Outcome in Γγ(P,k)
Let I = {i1, i2, i3, i4} be the set of students, S = {s1, s2, s3} be the set of schools, and
q = (1, 1, 1) be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure
f are given in the table below. Let k = 2 be the quota and Q ∈ Q(2)I as given below.
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Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4 fs1 fs2 fs3
s1 s2 s3 s1 i3 i1 i2
s2 s3 s1 s2 i1 i2 i4
s3 s1 s2 s3 i2 i3 i3
i4 i4 i1
Qi1 Qi2 Qi3 Qi4
s1 s2 s3 s1
s2 s3 s1 s2
One easily verifies that γ(Q) = {{i1, s1}, {i2, s2}, {i3, s3}, {i4}}. Since student i4 has
justified envy for school s3, γ(Q) 6∈ S(P ). It remains to show that Q ∈ Eγ(P, 2). Since
students i1, i2, and i3 are assigned a seat at their favorite school, it is sufficient to check
that student i4 has no profitable deviation. Notice that the only possibility for student i4
to change the outcome of the mechanism is by listing school s3. So, the only strategies that
we have to check are given by Q¯(2) = {Qa, Qb, Qc, Qd, Qe}, where Qa = s3, Qb = s1, s3,
Qc = s2, s3, Q
d = s3, s1, and Q
e = s3, s2. Routine computations show that none of these
strategies is a profitable deviation. So, Q ∈ Eγ(P, 2). ¦
In light of Example 6.3, can we find a value of the quota that ensures that all equi-
librium outcomes are stable?12 The next result gives a positive answer to this question.
Proposition 6.4 For any school choice problem P , the game Γγ(P, 1) implements S(P )
in Nash equilibria, i.e., Oγ(P, 1) = S(P ).
Proposition 6.4 is not very surprising. When the quota is 1 the DA algorithm consists of
only one step, which moreover coincides with the (then also unique step) of the Boston
algorithm, i.e., Γγ(P, 1) = Γβ(P, 1). In other words, Proposition 6.4 can be obtained as a
corollary to Theorem 5.1.
If setting the quota equal to 1 allows us to implement any stable matching, what
about higher values of the quota? One may well imagine that for some preference profile
and other values of the quota the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism also implements
the set of stable matchings. A sharp answer to this question would mostly likely lead to
specific classes of preference profiles. We can, however, prove a more interesting result:
The equilibria of the quota-games are nested in the sense that any k-Nash equilibrium
is also a k′-Nash equilibrium where k′ is greater than k. Hence, if for some value of the
quota an unstable matching obtains in equilibrium then it also obtains for any higher
value of the quota.
12In fact, Lemma A.2 in the Appendix shows that all Nash equilibrium outcomes are individually
rational and non wasteful. So, the question boils down to whether the equilibrium outcomes are free of
justified envy.
15
Theorem 6.5 For any school choice problem P and quotas k < k′, Eγ(P, k) ⊆ Eγ(P, k′).
Example 6.3 and Theorem 6.5 suggest that unstable equilibrium outcomes are difficult to
avoid in the quota-game that uses the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism. Hence, the
only degree of freedom that is left to obtain stable equilibrium outcomes is the schools’
priority structure. That is, the problem is now to see whether there exists a condition
on the priority structure under which the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism implements
the correspondence of stable matchings in Nash equilibria. As we show below, such a
condition exists and is known as acyclicity.
Definition 6.6 Ergin-Acyclicity (Ergin, 2002)13
Given a priority structure f , an Ergin-cycle is constituted of distinct s, s′ ∈ S and i, j, l ∈ I
such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
Ergin-cycle condition: fs(i) < fs(j) < fs(l) and fs′(l) < fs′(i) and
ec-scarcity condition: there exist (possibly empty and) disjoint sets Is, Is′ ⊆ I\{i, j, l}
such that Is ⊆ U fs (j), Is′ ⊆ U fs′(i), |Is| = qs − 1, and |Is′ | = qs′ − 1.
A priority structure is Ergin-acyclic if no Ergin-cycles exist. 4
Theorem 6.7 Let k 6= 1. Then, f is an Ergin-acyclic priority structure if and only if
for any school choice problem P , the game Γγ(P, k) implements S(P ) in Nash equilibria,
i.e., Oγ(P, k) = S(P ).
Ergin (2002) showed that Ergin-acyclicity of the priority structure is necessary and suffi-
cient for the Pareto-efficiency of the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism.14 Theorem 6.7
shows that Ergin-acyclicity has a different impact depending on whether one considers
the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism per se or in the context of the induced preference
revelation game. In the former case Ergin-acyclicity induces Pareto-efficiency while in the
latter case it leads to stability.
7 Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
Like for the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism, we first state the existence of k-Nash
equilibria for any value of the quota. Yet, for its proof we first establish several results
13Ergin (2002) used the terminology of cycles and acyclicity. However, since we will need to introduce
another acyclicity concept due to Kesten (2006) we conveniently change the terminology.
14Ergin (2002) also showed that Ergin-acyclicity is sufficient for group strategy-proofness and con-
sistency of the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism as well as necessary for each of these conditions
separately.
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about the structure of the set of Nash equilibria in order to circumvent certain difficul-
ties.15
Theorem 7.1 For any school choice problem P and quota k, Eτ (P, k) 6= ∅.
Very similarly to the Boston mechanism, the Top Trading Cycle mechanism was ini-
tially not introduced to produce stable matchings. Nevertheless, one may wonder whether
the equilibrium outcomes of the induced preference revelation game are stable. The main
reason to study this question is that both the Boston mechanism and the Student-Optimal
Stable mechanism perform differently as a mechanism per se or in the context of the in-
duced preference revelation game. In other words, a priori there is no reason to suspect
that the Top Trading Cycle mechanism is unable to produce stable matchings in equi-
libria. Before considering the stability properties of the equilibrium outcomes under the
Top Trading Cycle mechanism we first establish a major result concerning the set of Nash
equilibrium outcomes.
Theorem 7.2 For any school choice problem P and quota k, Oτ (P, k) = Oτ (P, 1).
Theorem 7.2 allows us to greatly simplify our analysis of the Nash equilibria. Indeed, if
a matching µ obtains in equilibrium we can use Theorem 7.2 to deduce, to some extent,
the strategies used by the students. More precisely, if in an equilibrium the matching µ
obtains then we can deduce that there exists an equilibrium in which each student i ∈ I
uses the strategy Qi = µ(i). In fact, we prove in the Appendix a stronger result than
Theorem 7.2. We indeed show that if we consider a k-Nash equilibrium Q, then restricting
the strategy of any student i ∈ I to only one element, τ(Q)(i) and leaving unchanged the
other students’ strategies also constitutes a k-Nash equilibrium. That is, if Q is a k-Nash
equilibrium then for any student i ∈ I, (τ(Q)(i), Q−i) is also a k-Nash equilibrium.
As we show below, Theorem 7.2 proves to be useful to study the relation between equi-
librium outcomes and the set of stable matchings. The following example already suggests
that regarding stability in equilibrium, the Top Trading Cycle mechanism performs worse
than the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism.16
Example 7.3 A School Choice Problem P with S(P ) ∩ Oτ (P, 1) = ∅
Let I = {i1, i2, i3} be the set of students, S = {s1, s2} be the set of schools, and q = (1, 1)
15The complexity of the TTC algorithm makes it indeed difficult to visualize the collection of new
cycles that may arise when a student deviates from a particular strategy profile.
16Using Theorem 7.2 one can nevertheless show that all Nash equilibrium outcomes are again individ-
ually rational and non wasteful. The proof is available from the authors upon request.
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be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure f are given
in the table below.
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 fs1 fs2
s2 s1 s1 i1 i3
i2 i2
i3 i1
It is easy to check that the unique stable matching is µ = {{i1, s2}, {i2, s1}, {i3}}. We
show that µ cannot be sustained at any Nash equilibrium of the game Γτ (P, 1). Suppose
to the contrary that µ can be sustained at some Nash equilibrium. In other words, there is
a profile Q ∈ Q(1)I such that τ(Q) = µ and Q ∈ Eτ (P, 1). Since τ(Q) = µ, Qi1 = s2 and
Qi2 = s1. If Qi3 = s1, then τ(Q)(i3) = s1 6= µ(i3). So, Qi3 6= s1. But then τ(Q′)Pi3τ(Q)
for Q′ := (Qi1 , Qi2 , s1). Hence, Q 6∈ Eτ (P, 1), a contradiction. ¦
Since there is no hope to choose an adequate level of the quota to ensure the stability
of the equilibrium outcomes under the Top Trading Cycle mechanism, we turn to the
second dimension of the mechanism, i.e., the schools’ priority structure. The issue here is
similar to that of the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism, i.e., to see whether there exists
a condition on the priority structure that would ensure the stability of any equilibrium
outcome. Indeed, the last result of this section is that Kesten’s (2006) acyclicity condi-
tion is necessary and sufficient for the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to implement the
correspondence of stable matchings in Nash equilibria.
Definition 7.4 Kesten-Acyclicity (Kesten, 2006)
Given a priority structure f , aKesten-cycle is constituted of distinct s, s′ ∈ S and i, j, l ∈ I
such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
Kesten-cycle condition fs(i) < fs(j) < fs(l) and fs′(l) < fs′(i), fs′(j) and
kc-scarcity condition there exists a (possibly empty) set Is ⊆ I\{i, j, l} with Is ⊆ U fs (i)∪[
U fs (j)\U fs′(l)
]
and |Is| = qs − 1.
A priority structure is Kesten-acyclic if no Kesten-cycles exist. 4
Kesten (2006) showed that Kesten-acyclicity of the priority structure is necessary and
sufficient for the stability of the Top Trading Cycles mechanism when students report their
true preferences.17 Kesten-acyclicity implies Ergin-acyclicity (Lemma 1, Kesten, 2006).
17Kesten (2006) also showed that Kesten-acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the Top Trading
Cycles mechanism to be resource monotonic and population monotonic. In addition, he also proved that
the Top Trading Cycles mechanism coincides with the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism if and only if
the priority structure is Kesten-acyclic.
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It is easy to check that the reverse holds if all schools have one seat.
Theorem 7.5 Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, f is a Kesten-acyclic priority structure if and only
if for any school choice problem P , the game Γτ (P, k) implements S(P ) in Nash equilibria,
i.e., Oτ (P, k) = S(P ).
Kesten’s (2006) result and Theorem 7.5 have in common that Kesten-acyclicity is both
necessary and sufficient for the stability of the Top Trading Cycle mechanism. Yet, it is
important to note that, contrary to Kesten (2006), in our game students typically cannot
reveal their true preferences.
8 Equilibria in Truncations
In this section we focus on “truncation” strategies which are shown to be undominated
in the quota-games induced by both the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism and the Top
Trading Cycles mechanism. We first strengthen the negative side of Theorems 6.7 and 7.5
by showing that the strategy profile of Example 6.3 is in fact a strong Nash equilibrium
in truncations that induces an unstable matching. Next, again for both mechanisms, we
will show that in general there is also no relation between the set of unassigned students
at equilibrium and the set of unassigned students in stable matchings. However, for Nash
equilibria in truncations we do obtain a positive result in this respect for the Student-
Optimal Stable mechanism.
One piece of advice about which preference list a student should submit follows from
the strategy-proofness of the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism and the Top Trading
Cycles mechanism in the unconstrained setting: it does not pay off to submit a list of
schools that does not respect the true order. More precisely, a list that does not respect
the order of a student’s true preferences is weakly dominated by listing the same schools
in the “true order.” Let ϕ be a mechanism. Student i’s strategy Qi ∈ Q(k) in the game
Γϕ(P, k) is weakly k-dominated by another strategy Q′i ∈ Q(k) if ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)Riϕ(Qi, Q−i)
for all Q−i ∈ Q(k)I\i.
Lemma 8.1 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Let i ∈ I be a student.
Consider two strategies Qi, Q
′
i ∈ Q(k) such that (a) Qi and Q′i contain the same set of
schools, and (b) for any two schools s and s′ listed in Qi (or Q′i), sQ
′
is
′ implies sPis′.
Then, Qi is weakly k-dominated by Q
′
i in the games Γ
γ(P, k) and Γτ (P, k).
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The message of Lemma 8.1 is clear: a student cannot lose (and may possibly gain) by
submitting the same set of schools in the true order. A plausible type of strategies that
satisfy this condition are the so-called truncations. A truncation of a preference list Pi is a
list P ′i obtained from Pi by deleting some school and all less preferred acceptable schools.
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The following lemma says that in the games Γγ(P, k) and Γτ (P, k) submitting a truncation
“as long as possible” is k-undominated. Formally, student i’s strategy Qi ∈ Q(k) is k-
dominated by another strategy Q′i ∈ Q(k) if ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)Riϕ(Qi, Q−i) for all Q−i ∈ Q(k)I\i
and ϕ(Q′i, Q
′
−i)Piϕ(Qi, Q
′
−i) for some Q
′
−i ∈ Q(k)I\i. A strategy in Q(k) is k-undominated
if it is not k-dominated by any other strategy in Q(k).
Lemma 8.2 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Let i ∈ I be a stu-
dent. Denote the number of (acceptable) schools in Pi by |Pi|. Then, the strategy P ki of
submitting the first min{k, |Pi|} schools of the true preference list Pi in the true order is
k-undominated in the games Γγ(P, k) and Γτ (P, k).
Although the strategy profile P k := (P ki )i∈I is a profile of k-undominated strategies, it
is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium in the games Γγ(P, k) and Γτ (P, k). In case it is a
Nash equilibrium it may still induce an unstable matching as Example 6.3 shows.
Example 6.3 continued. For both γ and τ : A Strong Nash Equilibrium in
(Undominated) Truncations that yields an Unstable Matching
Consider again the strategy profile Q = P 2 ∈ Q(2)I of 2-undominated truncations. Since
students i1, i2, and i3 are assigned a seat at their favorite school at γ(Q) and Q ∈ Eγ(P, 2),
it follows that Q is a strong Nash equilibrium (cf. Aumann, 1959) in Γγ(P, 2).
As for the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, one easily verifies that also τ(Q) = {{i1, s1},
{i2, s2}, {i3, s3}, {i4}}. For the same reason as before, it is sufficient to check that stu-
dent i4 has no profitable deviation. This, however, is immediate since student i4 cannot
“break” the cycle (i1, s1, i3, s3, i2, s2) that forms in the first step of the TTC algorithm.
Hence, Q is also a strong Nash equilibrium in Γτ (P, 2). ¦
The results of McVitie and Wilson (1970) and Roth (1984b) for college admissions imply
that for any school choice problem the set of unassigned students is the same for all stable
matchings.19 In other words, for µ, µ′ ∈ S(P ), µ(i) = i implies µ′(i) = i. Given the re-
18Truncations have been studied by Roth and Vande Vate (1991), Roth and Rothblum (1999), and
Ehlers (2004) and have also appeared in practice (see for instance Mongell and Roth, 1991).
19A generalization of this result is known in the two-sided matching literature as the “Rural Hospital
Theorem” (Roth, 1986) and says that the degree of occupation and quality of interns at typically less
demanded rural hospitals in the US is not due to the choice of a specific stable matching.
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strictiveness of the acyclicity conditions to guarantee stable Nash equilibrium outcomes,
one may wonder whether at least always the set of unassigned students at equilibrium
coincides with the set of unassigned students in stable matchings. In fact, a less ambitious
idea would be to establish that at equilibrium the number of unassigned students equals
the number of unassigned students in stable matchings. The following two examples show
that in general this is not true. In other words, the number of unassigned students at equi-
librium is not inherited from that of the set of stable matchings. Given Proposition 6.2,
this in particular implies for the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism that the number of
unassigned students can vary from one equilibrium outcome to another.
Example 8.3 For both γ and τ : Less Assigned Students in an Equilibrium than
in Stable Matchings
Let I = {i1, i2, i3} be the set of students, S = {s1, s2, s3} be the set of schools, and
q = (1, 1, 1) be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure
f are given in the table below. One easily verifies that strategy profile Q given below is
a Nash equilibrium in Γγ(P, 2) and Γτ (P, 2).
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 fs1 fs2 fs3
s1 s3 s3 i3 i2 i1
s3 s1 s2 i1 i3 i2
s2 s1 i2 i1 i3
Qi1 Qi2 Qi3
s1 s1 s3
s3 s1
Since γ(Q) = τ(Q) = {{i1, s1}, {i3, s3}, {i2}, {s2}} and γ(P ) = {{i1, s1}, {i2, s3}, {i3, s2}},
there are less assigned students at γ(Q) = τ(Q) than in any stable matching. ¦
Example 8.4 For both γ and τ : More Assigned Students in an Equilibrium
than in Stable Matchings
Let I = {i1, i2, i3} be the set of students, S = {s1, s2, s3} be the set of schools, and
q = (1, 1, 1) be the capacity vector. The students’ preferences P and the priority structure
f are given in the table below. One easily verifies that strategy profile Q given below is
a Nash equilibrium in Γγ(P, 2) and Γτ (P, 2).
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 fs1 fs2 fs3
s2 s3 s3 i3 i2 i1
s2 s2 i1 i3 i2
s1 s1 i2 i1 i3
Qi1 Qi2 Qi3
s2 s3 s1
s3 s2 s2
Since γ(Q) = τ(Q) = {{i1, s2}, {i2, s3}, {i3, s1}} and γ(P ) = {{i2, s3}, {i3, s2}, {i1}, {s1}},
there are more assigned students at γ(Q) = τ(Q) than in any stable matching. ¦
21
We do obtain a positive result for γ if we restrict ourselves to equilibria in trunca-
tions. More precisely, the following proposition says that if a profile of truncations is a
Nash equilibrium in the game Γγ(P, k) then the set of assigned students at the equilib-
rium coincides with the set of assigned students at any stable matching. In fact, each
Nash equilibrium in truncations in the game Γγ(P, k) yields a matching that is either
the student-optimal stable matching γ(P ) or Pareto dominates γ(P ). For a matching µ,
denote M(µ) for the set of assigned students, i.e., M(µ) := {i ∈ I : µ(i) 6= i}.
Proposition 8.5 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. If P k ∈ Eγ(P, k),
then M(γ(P k)) =M(γ(P )). In fact, γ(P k)Riγ(P ) for all i ∈ I.
For τ we cannot obtain a similar result as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 8.6 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. If P k ∈ Eτ (P, k),
then possibly |M(τ(P k))| < |M(γ(P ))| or |M(τ(P k))| > |M(γ(P ))|.
9 Discussion
Our results show that in all three school choice procedures stability can be guaranteed
by strategic interaction in spite of possible constraints on preference revelation. While
no particular assumption is needed for the Boston mechanism, stringent conditions are
required for the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles mech-
anism, namely Ergin-acyclicity and Kesten-acyclicity. Since real-life priority structures
typically do not satisfy these conditions, the transition to either the Student-Optimal
Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism may yield “unfair” assignments
in the sense that there are students that prefer a seat that is occupied by a lower priority
student. However, the use of the Nash equilibrium concept in the context of school choice
is not problem free. Since there is a large number of players in this one shot game and since
there is typically no weakly dominant strategy it is not obvious how players can find their
way to equilibrium play. The existence of parents groups that give advice on preference
revelation can be interpreted as players being able to learn from other players’ strategies
and assignments in previous years. Whether this type of recommendations can lead to
an approximation of a Nash equilibrium is an open question. Field data and experimen-
tal studies may provide an answer to this question.20 Also, throughout our analysis we
have assumed a complete information environment. Ergin and So¨nmez (2006, Example 4)
20Young (2004) is an excellent survey of approaches to the theory of learning in games.
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showed that their result for the Boston Mechanism does not carry over to incomplete
information environments. Therefore, analysis of field data and experimental work is also
necessary to determine to what extent the predictions and results are robust to changes
in the level of information.
To overcome the problem of equilibrium coordination one could also consider asking
students to submit a list containing all their acceptable schools. Obviously, this can be
very demanding in the case of a school district with a large number of schools. Indeed,
there is now a large literature showing that individuals’ decisions can be drastically af-
fected when the size of the choice set varies.21 One way out could be to allow students
to submit preference lists in the same way as school priorities are very often constructed
in real-life, i.e., allowing for indifference classes. In this situation parents would be asked
to submit a ranking of schools and/or sets of schools. A random device to break ties
between schools in the same equivalence class would give the regulator a strict ordering
of all acceptable schools for each participant.
Besides possible policy implications, our results also illuminate the importance of the
acyclicity conditions due to Ergin (2002) and Kesten (2006). We moreover contribute to
the theory of implementation in matching markets. To the best of our knowledge, the
current paper provides the first complete analysis of the equilibria in the preference revela-
tion game induced by the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles
mechanism. All previous studies, except Romero-Medina (1998), assumed students’ pref-
erence revelation to be unconstrained. Given the strategy-proofness of both mechanisms
in the unconstrained setting, an analysis of all (other) equilibria was therefore in some
sense unnecessary. It is well-known that in the context of two-sided matching, preference
revelation induced by stable mechanisms may have unstable equilibrium outcomes (cf.
Alcalde, 1996).22 In the context of school choice, where only one side of the market is
strategic, Ergin and So¨nmez (2006) showed that this negative result can be avoided by
using the Boston mechanism. We show that in this sense also the Student-Optimal Sta-
ble mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles mechanism can be employed, as long as the
priority structure is acyclic.
21See for instance Iyengar and Kamenica (2006).
22Other recent papers on implementation in various settings of two-sided matching include Pais (2006),
Shinotsuka and Takamiya (2003), Sotomayor (2003), and Suh (2003).
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A Appendix: Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism,
Proofs
Let Q ∈ QI . We denote DA(Q) for the application of the DA algorithm (with students
proposing) to Q.
The first part of the proof of Theorem 7 in Romero-Medina (1998) proves Proposi-
tion 6.2. Nevertheless, we provide, for the sake of completeness, a (more formal) proof of
Proposition 6.2.
Proof of Proposition 6.2 Let µ ∈ S(P ). Define Qi := µ(i) ∈ Q(k) for all i ∈ I. Then,
|{i ∈ I : Qi = s}| = |µ(s)| ≤ qs for all s ∈ S. It follows that in the first step of DA(Q)
no student is rejected. So, γ(Q) = µ. It remains to prove that Q ∈ Eγ(P, k). Suppose to
the contrary that Q /∈ Eγ(P, k). Then, there exists a student i and a strategy Q′i ∈ Q(k)
such that γ(Q′i, Q−i)Piγ(Q) = µ. Since γ(Q) = µ ∈ S(P ), γ(Q) ∈ IR(P ). Hence,
γ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) ∈ S. Denote s = γ(Q′i, Q−i)(i). Note i 6∈ µ(s). Consider DA(Q′i, Q−i).
Of the students in I\i, only the students in µ(s) make their unique proposal to s; all
other students make either a unique proposal to another school or make no proposal at
all. Since γ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) = s, it follows that student i starts making proposals but gets
rejected until he proposes to s and gets assigned a seat at s (now the DA algorithm ends
since no new proposals are made). Since under (Q′i, Q−i) school s accepts i it must be
that |µ(s)| < qs or there is a student j ∈ µ(s) with fs(j) > fs(i). In the first case, µ is
wasteful for P , contradicting µ ∈ S(P ). In the second case, student i has justified envy
at µ, also contradicting µ ∈ S(P ). So, Q ∈ Eγ(P, k). ¥
Proof of Proposition 6.4 Follows from Theorem 5.1 and Γγ(P, 1) = Γβ(P, 1). ¥
We will make use of the following two results to prove Theorem 6.5.
Lemma A.1 (Roth, 1982b, Lemma 1; cf. Roth and Sotomayor 1990, Lemma 4.8)
Let Q ∈ QI and i ∈ I. Let Q′i ∈ Q be a preference list whose first choice is γ(Q)(i) if
γ(Q)(i) 6= i, and the empty list otherwise. Then, γ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) = γ(Q)(i).
Lemma A.2 For any school choice problem P and quota k, Oγ(P, k) ⊆ IR(P )∩NW (P ).
Proof Let Q ∈ Eγ(P, k). It is immediate that γ(Q) ∈ IR(P ). We prove that γ(Q) ∈
NW (P ). Suppose to the contrary that γ(Q) 6∈ NW (P ). Then, there is a student i ∈ I
and a school s ∈ S with sPiγ(Q)(i) and |γ(Q)(s)| < qs. Let Q¯i be the empty list. Let
Q¯ := (Q¯i, Q−i). By a result of Gale and Sotomayor (1985b, Theorem 2) extended to the
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college admissions model (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Theorem 5.34), for each j ∈ I\i,
either γ(Q¯)(j) = γ(Q)(j) or γ(Q¯)(j)Qjγ(Q)(j). Hence, the set of schools to which each
j ∈ I\i proposes inDA(Q¯) is a subset of the schools to which he proposes inDA(Q). Since
moreover Q¯i is the empty list, each school receives in DA(Q¯) only a subset of the proposals
of DA(Q). For school s this immediately implies that |γ(Q¯)(s)| ≤ |γ(Q)(s)| < qs. So, if
we take Q′i = s then γ(Q
′
i, Q−i)(i) = s. Since sPiγ(Q)(i), Q
′
i is a profitable deviation for
i at Q in Γγ(P, k). So, Q 6∈ Eγ(P, k), a contradiction. Hence, γ(Q) ∈ NW (P ). ¥
Proof of Theorem 6.5 It suffices to prove the proposition for k′ = k + 1. Let Q ∈
Eγ(P, k) and suppose that Q /∈ Eγ(P, k + 1). Hence, there is a student i and a strategy
Q′i ∈ Q(k + 1) such that γ(Q′i, Q−i)Piγ(Qi, Q−i). By Lemma A.2, γ(Q) ∈ IR(P ). Hence,
γ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) ∈ S. Note also that Q′i must be a list containing exactly k + 1 schools, for
otherwise it would also be a profitable deviation in Γγ(P, k), contradicting Q ∈ Eγ(P, k).
Let s be the last school listed in Q′i. We claim that γ(Q
′
i, Q−i)(i) = s. Suppose not.
Consider the truncation of Q′i after γ(Q
′
i, Q−i)(i) and denote this list by Q
′′
i . In other
words, Q′′i is the list obtained from Q
′
i by making all schools listed after γ(Q
′
i, Q−i)(i)
unacceptable. By assumption, Q′′i ∈ Q(k). It follows from the DA algorithm that
γ(Q′′i , Q−i) = γ(Q
′
i, Q−i). Hence, Q
′′
i is a profitable deviation for i at Q in Γ
γ(P, k), a
contradiction. So, γ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) = s.
Let Q̂i := s. Note Q̂i ∈ Q(k). By Lemma A.1, γ(Q̂i, Q−i)(i) = s. Hence, Q̂i is a
profitable deviation for i at Q in Γγ(P, k), a contradiction. Hence, Q ∈ Eγ(P, k + 1). ¥
We need the following three lemmas to prove Theorem 6.7.
Lemma A.3 Let f be an Ergin-cyclic priority structure. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, there
is a school choice problem P with an unstable equilibrium outcome in the game Γγ(P, k),
i.e., for some Q ∈ Eγ(P, k), γ(Q) 6∈ S(P ).
Proof Since f is Ergin-cyclic, we may assume, without loss of generality, that schools
s1 and s2 and students i1, i2, and i3 constitute an Ergin-cycle. In fact, we may assume,
without loss of generality, that
(a) fs1(i1) < fs1(i2) < fs1(i3) and fs2(i3) < fs2(i1),
(b) fs1(ij) < fs1(i2) for j ∈ {4, . . . , qs1 + 2}, and
(c) fs2(ij) < fs2(i1) for j ∈ {qs1 + 3, . . . , qs1 + qs2 + 1}.
Consider students’ preferences P given below. (Unacceptable schools are not depicted.)
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Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 Pi4 · · · Piqs1+2 Piqs1+3 · · · Piqs1+qs2+1 Piqs1+qs2+2 · · · Pin
s2 s1 s1 s1 s1 s1 s2 s2 s2
s1 s2
We distinguish among three cases for the priority ordering fs2 of school s2 with respect
to students i1, i2, and i3:
(i) fs2(i2) < fs2(i3) < fs2(i1),
(ii) fs2(i3) < fs2(i2) < fs2(i1), or
(iii) fs2(i3) < fs2(i1) < fs2(i2).
Consider DA(P ). First note that by construction of P and (b) and (c), all students
in {i4, . . . , iqs1+qs2+1} are assigned a seat at their most preferred school. Since for each
j ∈ {qs1 + qs2 +2, . . . , n}, student ij finds all schools unacceptable, one seat of each of the
schools s1 and s2 remains to be assigned to the students in {i1, i2, i3}. One easily verifies
that in each of the cases (i), (ii), and (iii), the DA algorithm assigns students i1 and i3 to
schools s1 and s2, respectively. Finally, one readily verifies that there is no other stable
matching for P . Hence, the unique stable matching for P is µ∗ = γ(P ) in which students
i1 and i3 are assigned a seat at schools s1 and s2, respectively (and student i2 remains
unassigned).
Consider Q ∈ Q(k)I given below. We will show that γ(Q) 6∈ S(P ), yet Q ∈ Eγ(P, k).
Qi1 Qi2 Qi3 Qi4 · · · Qiqs1+2 Qiqs1+3 · · · Qiqs1+qs2+1 Qiqs1+qs2+2 · · · Qin
s2 s1 s1 s1 s1 s2 s2 s2
s1 s2
Consider DA(Q). As before, all students in {i4, . . . , iqs1+qs2+1} are assigned a seat at their
most preferred school. One seat of each of the schools s1 and s2 remains to be assigned
to the students in {i1, i2, i3}. Since Qi2 is the empty list, and students i1 and i3 have
different favorite schools at Q, the DA algorithm assigns in each of the three cases (i),
(ii), and (iii), students i1 and i3 to schools s2 and s1, respectively. So, γ(Q) 6= µ∗. Since
S(P ) = {µ∗}, γ(Q) 6∈ S(P ). Finally, we check that Q ∈ Eγ(P, k). Note that at γ(Q) each
of the students i1 and i3 is assigned a seat at his favorite school. So, neither student i1
nor i3 has a profitable deviation from his strategy Qi1 and Qi3 , respectively. One easily
verifies that in each of the cases (i), (ii), and (iii), and for each strategy Q′i2 ∈ Q(k),
γ(Q)Ri2γ(Qi1 , Q
′
i2
, Qi3). Hence, Q ∈ Eγ(P, k). ¥
A mechanism is non bossy if no student can maintain his allotment and cause a change
in the other students’ allotments by reporting different preferences.
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Definition A.4 Non Bossy Mechanism (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981)
A mechanism ϕ is non bossy if for all i ∈ I, Qi, Q′i ∈ Q, and Q−i ∈ QI\i, ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) =
ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) implies ϕ(Q′i, Q−i) = ϕ(Qi, Q−i). 4
Lemma A.5 Let f be an Ergin-acyclic priority structure. Then, γ is non bossy.
Proof Follows from Ergin’s (2002) Theorem 1, (iv) → (iii) and proof of (iii) → (ii).
¥
Lemma A.6 Let f be an Ergin-acyclic priority structure. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, for any
school choice problem P all equilibrium outcomes in the game Γγ(P, k) are stable, i.e., for
all Q ∈ Eγ(P, k), γ(Q) ∈ S(P ).
Proof Suppose to the contrary that Q ∈ Eγ(P, k) but γ(Q) 6∈ S(P ). So, by Lemma A.2,
there are two students i, j ∈ I, i 6= j and a school s ∈ S such that γ(Q)(j) = s, sPiγ(Q)(i),
and fs(i) < fs(j).
Since γ is strategy-proof in the unconstrained setting (i.e., when the quota equals m,
the number of schools), γ(Pi, Q−i)Riγ(Qi, Q−i). Let Q′i := γ(Pi, Q−i)(i). Clearly, Q
′
i ∈
Q(k). By Lemma A.1, γ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) = γ(Pi, Q−i)(i). Hence, γ(Q′i, Q−i)Riγ(Qi, Q−i).
If γ(Q′i, Q−i)Piγ(Qi, Q−i), then Q 6∈ Eγ(P, k), a contradiction. Hence, γ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) =
γ(Qi, Q−i)(i).
By Lemma A.5, γ is non bossy. Hence, γ(Pi, Q−i) = γ(Q′i, Q−i) = γ(Q). In particular,
γ(Pi, Q−i)(j) = γ(Q)(j) = s. Since sPiγ(Q)(i) = γ(Pi, Q−i)(i), student i has justified
envy at γ(Pi, Q−i), contradicting γ(Pi, Q−i) ∈ S(Pi, Q−i). Hence, γ(Q) ∈ S(P ). ¥
Proof of Theorem 6.7 Follows from Proposition 6.2 and Lemmas A.3 and A.6. ¥
B Appendix: Top Trading Cycles Mechanism, Proofs
We first introduce the following graph-theoretic notation to provide concise proofs of our
results. Let Q ∈ QI . Suppose the TTC algorithm is applied to Q, which we will denote
by TTC(Q), and suppose it terminates in no less than l steps. We denote by G(Q, l) the
(directed) graph that corresponds to step l. In this graph, the set of vertices V (Q, l) is
the set of agents present in step l. For any v ∈ V (Q, l) there is a (unique) directed edge
in G(Q, l) from v to some v′ ∈ V (Q, l) (possibly v′ = v if v ∈ I) if agent v points to agent
v′, which will also be denoted by e(Q, l, v) = v′.
A path (from v1 to vp) in G(Q, l) is an ordered list of agents (v1, v2, . . . , vp) such that
vr ∈ V (Q, l) for all r = 1, . . . , p and each vr points to vr+1 for all r = 1, . . . , p − 1. A
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self-cycle (i) of a student i is a degenerate path, i.e., i points to himself in G(Q, l). An
agent v′ ∈ V (Q, l) is a follower of an agent v ∈ V (Q, l) if there is a path from v to v′
in G(Q, l). The set of followers of v is denoted by F (Q, l, v). An agent v′ ∈ V (Q, l) is a
predecessor of an agent v ∈ V (Q, l) if there is a path from v′ to v in G(Q, l). The set of
predecessors of v is denoted by P (Q, l, v). A cycle in G(Q, l) is a path (v1, v2, . . . , vp) such
that also vp points to v1. Note that a self-cycle is a special case of a cycle. With a slight
abuse of notation we sometimes refer to a cycle as the corresponding non ordered set of
involved agents. Finally, for v ∈ I ∪ S, let σ(Q, v) denote the step of the TTC algorithm
at which agent v is removed.
The following observation on the TTC algorithm is key for the results in Section 7.
Observation B.1 In the TTC algorithm, once a student points to a school it will keep
on pointing to the school in subsequent steps until he is assigned to a seat at the school
or until the school has no longer available seats. In other words, if i ∈ V (Q, l) ∩ I for
some step l of TTC(Q) and e(Q, l, i) = s ∈ S, then e(Q, r, i) = s for all steps r with
l ≤ r ≤ min{σ(Q, i), σ(Q, s)}. Similarly, once a school points to a student it will keep on
pointing to the student in subsequent steps until the student is assigned to a seat at this
or some other school. In other words, if s ∈ V (Q, l) ∩ S for some step l of TTC(Q) and
e(Q, l, s) = i ∈ I, then e(Q, r, s) = i for all steps r with l ≤ r ≤ σ(Q, i).
We now proceed to establish some preliminary results and slightly technical lemmas
to be able to prove Theorems 7.1 and 7.2.
Lemma B.2 For any school choice problem P and any quota k, Oτ (P, k) ⊆ IR(P ) .
Proof Immediate. ¥
In order to avoid possible confusion we will sometimes use an additional superindex
Q and write qQ,rs instead of q
r
s .
Lemma B.3 Let Q ∈ QI . Let i ∈ I and Q′i ∈ Q. Define Q′ := (Q′i, Q−i). Suppose
τ(Q)(i) 6= τ(Q′)(i). Let p := σ(Q, i), p′ := σ(Q′, i), and r := min{p, p′}. Then,
(a) at steps 1, . . . , r − 1, the same cycles form in TTC(Q) and TTC(Q′);
(b) i ∈ V (Q, r) = V (Q′, r) and for each school s ∈ V (Q, r) ∩ S, qQ,rs = qQ′,rs ;
(c) e(Q, r, v) = e(Q′, r, v) for each agent v ∈ V (Q, r)\i;
(d) there is a cycle C with i ∈ C in either G(Q, r) or G(Q′, r) (but not both).23
23Note that it is still possible that there is another cycle C¯ (i.e., C¯ 6= C) with i ∈ C¯ present in the
other graph.
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Proof Item (a) follows from the proof of a result in Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (1999,
Lemma 1) or, alternatively, Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003, Lemma). As for Item (b),
from the definition of r, i ∈ V (Q, r)∩V (Q′, r). The remainder of Item (b) follows directly
from Item (a). Item (c) follows from Item (b) and the fact that Q′j = Qj for all students
j ∈ I\i. As for Item (d), by definition of r, there is a cycle C with i ∈ C in G(Q, r) or
G(Q′, r). From Item (c) and τ(Q)(i) 6= τ(Q′)(i), e(Q, r, i) 6= e(Q′, r, i). In particular, C
is not a cycle in both G(Q, r) and G(Q′, r). This proves Item (d). ¥
The following definition introduces a class of mechanisms that induce nested Nash
equilibria.
Definition B.4 Individually Idempotent Mechanism
A mechanism ϕ is individually idempotent if for any Q ∈ QI , any i ∈ I, Q′i = ϕ(Q)(i) ∈
Q(1) implies ϕ(Q′i, Q−i) = ϕ(Q). 4
Note that Example 6.3 shows that the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism is not in-
dividually idempotent: γ(Qi1 , Q
c, Qi3) = {{i1, s1}, {i3, s2}, {i2}} but γ(Qi1 , Qe, Qi3) =
{{i1, s2}, {i3, s1}, {i2}}. However, as we will see, the Top Trading Cycles mechanism is
individually idempotent.
Proposition B.5 Let ϕ be an individually idempotent mechanism. For any school choice
problem P and quotas k < k′, Eϕ(P, k) ⊆ Eϕ(P, k′).
Proof Let Q ∈ Eϕ(P, k). Suppose to the contrary that Q /∈ Eϕ(P, k′). Then there exist
a student i and a list Q¯i ∈ Q(k′) such that ϕ(Q¯i, Q−i)Piϕ(Q). Let Q¯′i := ϕ(Q¯i, Q−i)(i).
Clearly, Q¯′i ∈ Q(k). Since ϕ is individually idempotent, ϕ(Q¯′i, Q−i) = ϕ(Q¯i, Q−i). So,
ϕ(Q¯′i, Q−i)Piϕ(Q), contradicting Q ∈ Eϕ(P, k). Hence, Q ∈ Eϕ(P, k′). ¥
Lemma B.6 Mechanism τ is individually idempotent.
Proof Let Q ∈ QI . Let i ∈ I and define Q′i := τ(Q)(i) ∈ Q(1). Define Q′ := (Q′i, Q−i).
We have to show that τ(Q′) = τ(Q). By non bossiness of τ ,24 it is sufficient to show
that τ(Q′)(i) = τ(Q)(i). If τ(Q)(i) = i, then from the definition of the TTC algorithm,
τ(Q′)(i) = i = τ(Q)(i).
So, suppose τ(Q)(i) =: s ∈ S. Suppose to the contrary that τ(Q′)(i) 6= τ(Q)(i). Then,
since Q′i = τ(Q)(i) = s, student i remains unassigned under Q
′, i.e., τ(Q′)(i) = i. Let
24Pa´pai’s (2000) main result implies that τ is group strategy-proof. Group strategy-proofness implies
non bossiness.
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p := σ(Q, i), p′ := σ(Q′, i), and r := min{p, p′}. By Lemma B.3(d), there is a cycle C
with i ∈ C in either G(Q, r) or G(Q′, r) (but not both).
Suppose cycle C is in G(Q, r) but not in G(Q′, r). Since student i is assigned through
cycle C and τ(Q)(i) = s, e(Q, r, i) = s. Since e(Q′, r, i) 6= e(Q, r, i) and Q′i = τ(Q)(i) = s,
e(Q′, r, i) = i. Hence, at the beginning of step r of TTC(Q′), school s has no avail-
able seats, i.e., qQ
′,r
s = 0. By Lemma B.3(b), q
Q,r
s = q
Q′,r
s = 0. So, e(Q, r, i) 6= s, a
contradiction.
So, cycle C is in G(Q′, r) but not in G(Q, r). If e(Q′, r, i) = s, then τ(Q′)(i) = s,
a contradiction with τ(Q′)(i) 6= τ(Q)(i). So by Q′i = τ(Q)(i) = s, e(Q′, r, i) = i, i.e.,
C = (i) is a self-cycle. Since i ∈ V (Q, r) and τ(Q)(i) = s, qQ,rs > 0. By Lemma B.3(b),
qQ
′,r
s = q
Q,r
s > 0. So, s ∈ V (Q′, r). But then from Q′i = s, e(Q′, r, i) = s, a contradiction.
We conclude that τ(Q′)(i) = τ(Q)(i). ¥
Proposition B.7 For any school choice problem P and quotas k < k′, Eτ (P, k) ⊆
Eτ (P, k′).
Proof Follows from Proposition B.5 and Lemma B.6. ¥
Lemma B.8 Let Q¯ ∈ QI . Let v, v′ ∈ I ∪ S, v 6= v′. Suppose v′ ∈ P (Q¯, l, v) at some
step l of TTC(Q¯). Then, σ(Q¯, v) ≤ σ(Q¯, v′) and [σ(Q¯, v) = σ(Q¯, v′) only if v and v′ are
removed in the same cycle].
Proof By Observation B.1, each agent in the path from v′ to v will keep on pointing to
its follower at least until the step in which agent v is removed, i.e., step σ(Q¯, v). Hence,
σ(Q¯, v) ≤ σ(Q¯, v′). Suppose σ(Q¯, v) = σ(Q¯, v′). Then, all agents in the path from v′ to
v form part of a cycle at this step. Since an agent can be part of at most one cycle at a
given step, all agents in the path from v′ to v are in the same cycle. ¥
Lemma B.9 Let Q ∈ QI . Let i ∈ I and Q′i ∈ Q. Define Q′ := (Q′i, Q−i). Suppose
τ(Q)(i) 6= τ(Q′)(i) and σ(Q, i) ≤ σ(Q′, i). Then, for each step l with σ(Q, i) ≤ l ≤
σ(Q′, i), if v ∈ V (Q′, l)\(P (Q′, l, i) ∪ i) then v ∈ V (Q, l) and F (Q, l, v) = F (Q′, l, v).
Proof Let p := σ(Q, i) and p′ := σ(Q′, i). From Lemma B.3(b),
V (Q, p) = V (Q′, p) and qQ,ps = q
Q′,p
s for each school s ∈ V (Q, p) ∩ S. (1)
With a slight abuse of notation, for each l, p ≤ l ≤ p′, denote Pl = P (Q′, l, i) ∪ i. From
Observation B.1,
Pp ⊆ Pp+1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Pp′−1 ⊆ Pp′ . (2)
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Also note
V (Q′, p′) ⊆ V (Q′, p′ − 1) ⊆ · · · ⊆ V (Q′, p+ 1) ⊆ V (Q′, p). (3)
We are done if we prove the following Claim(l) for each l, p ≤ l ≤ p′.
Claim(l): If v ∈ V (Q′, l)\Pl, then v ∈ V (Q, l) and e(Q, l, v) = e(Q′, l, v).
Indeed, Claim(l) immediately implies the following Consequence(l):
Consequence(l): If v ∈ V (Q′, l)\Pl, then v ∈ V (Q, l) and F (Q, l, v) = F (Q′, l, v).
We now prove by induction that Claim(l) is true for each l, p ≤ l ≤ p′. By Lemma B.3
(b) and (c), V (Q, p) = V (Q′, p) and e(Q, p, v) = e(Q′, p, v) for each agent v ∈ V (Q, p)\i.
Hence, Claim(p) is true.
If p′ = p we are done. So, suppose p′ 6= p. Let l be a step such that p < l ≤ p′.
Assume Claim(g) is true for all g, p ≤ g < l ≤ p′. We prove that Claim(l) is true. Let
v ∈ V (Q′, l)\Pl. From (2) and (3), v ∈ V (Q′, g)\Pg for each step g, p ≤ g < l. From
Consequence(g) (p ≤ g < l), v ∈ V (Q, g) and
F (Q, g, v) = F (Q′, g, v) for each step g, p ≤ g < l. (4)
Since v ∈ V (Q′, l), v is not removed at the end of step l − 1 in TTC(Q′). Then by (1)
and (4), v is also not removed at the end of step l − 1 in TTC(Q). Hence, v ∈ V (Q, l).
Assume Claim(l) is not true, i.e., e(Q, l, v) 6= e(Q′, l, v). Let x := e(Q, l, v) and
x′ := e(Q′, l, v). Since v 6∈ Pl, x′ 6∈ Pl. By (2), x′ 6∈ Pl−1. By (3) and x′ ∈ V (Q′, l),
x′ ∈ V (Q′, l − 1). By Consequence(l − 1), x′ ∈ V (Q, l − 1). We distinguish between two
cases.
Case 1: Agent x′ is removed at the end of step l − 1 in TTC(Q).
From (2) and (3), x′ ∈ V (Q′, g)\Pg for each step g, p ≤ g < l. From Consequence(g)
(p ≤ g < l), x′ ∈ V (Q, g) and
F (Q, g, x′) = F (Q′, g, x′) for each step g, p ≤ g < l. (5)
By (1), (5), and the fact that x′ is removed at the end of step l− 1 in TTC(Q), x′ is also
removed at the end of step l − 1 in TTC(Q′). Hence, x′ 6∈ V (Q′, l), a contradiction with
e(Q′, l, v) = x′.
Case 2: Agent x′ is not removed at the end of step l − 1 in TTC(Q).
Then, x′ ∈ V (Q, l). Since e(Q, l, v) = x and x 6= x′, we have xQvx′ (if v is a student)
or fv(x) < fv(x
′) (if v is a school). Since v 6∈ Pl, v 6= i. Hence, since e(Q′, l, v) = x′,
x 6∈ V (Q′, l). So, agent x was removed at some step g∗, 1 ≤ g∗ ≤ l − 1, in TTC(Q′). In
fact, by (1), p ≤ g∗ ≤ l − 1. Note that no agent in Pp′ is removed before the end of step
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p′ in TTC(Q′). So, x 6∈ Pp′ . By (2), x 6∈ Pg∗ . Hence, x ∈ V (Q′, g∗)\Pg∗ . By an argument
similar to that of Case 1, x is also removed at the end of step g∗ in TTC(Q). Hence,
x 6∈ V (Q, l), a contradiction with e(Q, l, v) = x. ¥
Lemma B.10 Let Q ∈ QI . Let i ∈ I and Q′i ∈ Q. Define Q′ := (Q′i, Q−i). Suppose
there is a student j ∈ I\i with τ(Q)(j) 6= τ(Q′)(j). Then,
(a) σ(Q, i) ≤ σ(Q, j) and [σ(Q, i) = σ(Q, j) only if i and j are assigned in the same
cycle in TTC(Q)], and
(b) σ(Q′, i) ≤ σ(Q′, j) and [σ(Q′, i) = σ(Q′, j) only if i and j are assigned in the same
cycle in TTC(Q′)].
Proof By non bossiness of τ , τ(Q)(i) 6= τ(Q′)(i). Let p := σ(Q, i) and p′ := σ(Q′, i).
Assume, without loss of generality, p ≤ p′. Then, by definition of p and Lemma B.3(d),
there is a cycle C in G(Q, p) with i ∈ C but not present in G(Q′, p).
We first prove (a). By Lemma B.3(a,b), for each student h ∈ I\i with σ(Q, h) < p or
σ(Q′, h) < p, τ(Q)(h) = τ(Q′)(h). Let r := σ(Q, j) and r′ := σ(Q′, j). Since τ(Q)(j) 6=
τ(Q′)(j), we have r, r′ ≥ p. So, σ(Q, i) = p ≤ r = σ(Q, j). Suppose σ(Q, i) = σ(Q, j).
We have to show that j ∈ C. Suppose to the contrary that j 6∈ C. Then, j ∈ C∗ for
some cycle C∗, C∗ 6= C, in G(Q, p). Note i 6∈ C∗. By Lemma B.3(b), V (Q, p) = V (Q′, p).
Hence, since e(Q, p, v) = e(Q′, p, v) for each agent v ∈ V (Q, p)\i, C∗ is also a cycle in
G(Q′, p). In particular, τ(Q)(j) = τ(Q′)(j), a contradiction. This completes the proof of
(a).
We now prove (b). We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: j ∈ P (Q′, p, i).
Then, (b) follows directly from Lemma B.8 with Q¯ = Q′, v′ = j, and v = i.
Case 2: j 6∈ P (Q′, p, i).
Assume that (b) is not true. In other words, assume that σ(Q′, i) > σ(Q′, j) or [σ(Q′, i) =
σ(Q′, j) and i and j are assigned in different cycles in TTC(Q′)]. Then, σ(Q, i) = p ≤
r′ = σ(Q′, j) ≤ σ(Q′, i).
Note that by definition of r′, j ∈ V (Q′, r′). Suppose j ∈ (P (Q′, r′, i) ∪ i). Since j 6= i,
j ∈ P (Q′, r′, i). By Lemma B.8, σ(Q′, i) ≤ σ(Q′, j) and [σ(Q′, i) = σ(Q′, j) only if i and
j are removed in the same cycle in TTC(Q′)]. This contradicts the assumption that (b)
is not true. So, j /∈ (P (Q′, r′, i) ∪ i). In other words, v ∈ V (Q′, r′)\(P (Q′, r′, i) ∪ i).
Hence, by Lemma B.9, j ∈ V (Q, r′) and F (Q, r′, j) = F (Q′, r′, j). Since σ(Q′, j) = r′,
student j forms part of a cycle, say C ′, in G(Q′, r′). Hence, C ′ = F (Q′, r′, j). So, also
C ′ = F (Q, r′, j). Hence, student j is assigned to the same school (or himself) in TTC(Q)
and TTC(Q′), contradicting τ(Q)(j) 6= τ(Q′)(j). This completes the proof of (b). ¥
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Lemma B.11 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Let Q ∈ Eτ (P, k).
Define Q¯i := τ(Q)(i) for all i ∈ I. Then, Q¯ ∈ Eτ (P, 1) and τ(Q¯) = τ(Q). In particular,
Oτ (P, k) ⊆ Oτ (P, 1).
Proof It is sufficient to prove the following claim:
Claim: Let P be a school choice problem. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m, Q ∈ Eτ (P, k), and j ∈ I. Let
Q˜j := τ(Q)(j). Then, Q˜ := (Q˜j, Q−j) ∈ Eτ (P, k).
Indeed, if the Claim holds true we can pick students one after another and eventually
obtain a profile Q¯ ∈ Eτ (P, k) where for all j ∈ I, Q¯j = τ(Q)(j). By construction,
Q¯ ∈ Q(1)I . So, Q¯ ∈ Eτ (P, 1). By repeated use of Lemma B.6, τ(Q¯) = τ(Q).
To prove the Claim, suppose to the contrary that Q˜ /∈ Eτ (P, k). So, there is a student
i with a profitable deviation at Q˜ in Γτ (P, k). In fact, by Lemma B.6 there is a list
Q′i ∈ Q(1) with
τ(Q′i, Q˜−i)Piτ(Qi, Q˜−i). (6)
By Lemma B.6, τ(Q˜) = τ(Q). We claim that i 6= j. Suppose i = j. Then Q˜−i = Q˜−j =
Q−j. Hence, (6) becomes τ(Q′j, Q−j)Pjτ(Qj, Q−j) contradicting Q ∈ Eτ (P, k). So, i 6= j.
Recall Q˜ = (Qi, Q˜j, Q−ij). Define Q˜′ := (Q′i, Q˜j, Q−ij) and Q
′ := (Q′i, Qj, Q−ij) . We
can rewrite (6) as
τ(Q˜′) = τ(Q′i, Q˜j, Q−ij)Piτ(Qi, Q˜j, Q−ij) = τ(Q˜). (7)
From Q ∈ Eτ (P, k) and Lemma B.2, τ(Q˜) = τ(Q) ∈ IR(P ). By (7), τ(Q˜′)(i) ∈ S. Let
s := τ(Q˜′)(i). Since Q˜′i = Q
′
i ∈ Q(1), Q′i = s.
Suppose τ(Q′)(j) = τ(Q)(j). Recall Q˜j = τ(Q)(j). So, Q˜j = τ(Q′)(j). Hence, Lemma
B.6 implies τ(Q′i, Q˜j, Q−ij) = τ(Q
′
i, Qj, Q−ij) and τ(Qi, Q˜j, Q−ij) = τ(Qi, Qj, Q−ij) . Then
(7) can be rewritten as τ(Q′i, Qj, Q−ij)Piτ(Qi, Qj, Q−ij) . So, Q /∈ Eτ (P, k), a contradic-
tion. Hence, τ(Q′)(j) 6= τ(Q)(j).
We claim that τ(Q′)(i) 6= τ(Q˜′)(i). To prove this, suppose to the contrary that
τ(Q′)(i) = τ(Q˜′)(i). Since τ(Q˜) = τ(Q), (7) boils down to τ(Q′)Piτ(Q), which implies
that Q /∈ Eτ (P, k), a contradiction. So, τ(Q′)(i) 6= τ(Q˜′)(i).
Note that for any student h 6= i, Q′h = Qh. So, by Lemma B.10, σ(Q′, i) ≤ σ(Q′, j).
Note also that for any student h 6= j, Q˜′h = Q′h. So, by Lemma B.10, σ(Q′, j) ≤ σ(Q′, i).
So, σ(Q′, i) = σ(Q′, j). From Lemma B.10 it follows that i and j are in the same cycle
in TTC(Q′). So, i is not in a self-cycle. Hence, i is assigned to a school in TTC(Q′).
Since Q′i = s, τ(Q
′)(i) = s. By definition, s = τ(Q˜′)(i). So, τ(Q′)(i) = τ(Q˜′)(i), a
contradiction. Hence, Q˜ ∈ Eτ (P, k), which completes the proof of the Claim. ¥
33
Proof of Theorem 7.2 Follows from Proposition B.7 and Lemma B.11. ¥
Proof of Theorem 7.1 In the unconstrained setting mechanism τ is strategy-proof.
Hence, P ∈ Eτ (P,m). By Theorem 7.2, τ(P ) ∈ Oτ (P, k) for any 1 ≤ k ≤ m. ¥
In order to prove Theorem 7.5 we need the following two lemmas.
Lemma B.12 Let f be a Kesten-cyclic priority structure. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, there
is a school choice problem P with an unstable equilibrium outcome in the game Γτ (P, k),
i.e., for some Q ∈ Eτ (P, k), τ(Q) 6∈ S(P ).
Proof By Theorem 1 of Kesten (2006), there is a school choice problem P such that
τ(P ) is unstable. Since τ is strategy-proof, P ∈ Eτ (P,m). Hence, by Theorem 7.2,
τ(P ) ∈ Oτ (P,m) = Oτ (P, k). So, there is a profile Q ∈ Q(k)I such that Q ∈ Eτ (P, k)
and τ(Q) = τ(P ) 6∈ S(P ). ¥
Lemma B.13 Let f be a Kesten-acyclic priority structure. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, for
any school choice problem P all equilibrium outcomes in the game Γτ (P, k) are stable, i.e.,
for all Q ∈ Eτ (P, k), τ(Q) ∈ S(P ). In fact, S(P ) = Oτ (P, k).
Proof By Theorem 1 of Kesten (2006), τ = γ. Hence, Oτ (P, k) = Oγ(P, k). By
Lemma 1 of Kesten (2006), f is Ergin-acyclic. So, from Theorem 6.7, S(P ) = Oγ(P, k) =
Oτ (P, k). ¥
Proof of Theorem 7.5 Follows from Lemmas B.12 and B.13. ¥
C Appendix: Proofs of Results in Section 8
Proof of Lemma 8.1 Let ϕ := γ, τ . The result follows directly from the strategy-
proofness of γ (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982b) and τ (Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez, 2003) by using Q′i as student i’s “true preferences:” ϕ(Q
′
i, Q−i)(i) is ranked
higher than ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) by Q′i, hence ϕ(Q
′
i, Q−i)(i) is ranked higher than ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i)
by Pi. ¥
Proof of Lemma 8.2 Let ϕ := γ, τ . We will prove that ϕ(P ki , Q−i)(i) = ϕ(Q)(i) for
all Q−i ∈ Q(k)I\i or ϕ(P ki , Q′−i)Piϕ(Qi, Q′−i) for some Q′−i ∈ Q(k)I\i. (This obviously
completes the proof as it implies that no strategy k-dominates P ki .)
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Suppose ϕ(P ki , Q−i)(i) 6= ϕ(Q)(i) for some Q−i ∈ Q(k)I\i. We have to show that
for some Q′−i ∈ Q(k)I\i, ϕ(P ki , Q′−i)Piϕ(Qi, Q′−i). Suppose that for some Q˜−i ∈ QI\i,
ϕ(Qi, Q˜−i)Piϕ(P ki , Q˜−i). Since ϕ(P
k
i , Q˜−i)(i)Rii, we have s˜ := ϕ(Qi, Q˜−i)(i) ∈ S. From
Lemma A.1 (for γ) and Lemma B.6 (for τ), ϕ(s˜, Q˜−i)(i) = ϕ(Qi, Q˜−i)(i).
Suppose s˜ is also listed in P ki . Then,
ϕ(P ki , Q˜−i)(i)Riϕ(P
′k
i , Q˜−i)(i) = ϕ(s˜, Q˜−i)(i) = s˜, (8)
where P ′ki is the preference relation obtained from P
k
i by putting s˜ in the first position.
The first relation follows from Lemma 8.1. The second relation follows from the fact that
the assignment by the DA/TTC algorithm does not change if a student makes more schools
acceptable and puts them below the school he is assigned to. Clearly, (8) contradicts
ϕ(Qi, Q˜−i)Piϕ(P ki , Q˜−i). Hence, s˜ is not listed in P
k
i .
Let S˜ := {s ∈ S\s˜ : sQis˜ }. The fact that s˜ is not listed in P ki together with the
definition of P ki implies that there is a school s 6∈ S˜ listed in P ki with sPis˜. Let s∗ be the
Pi-best school among the schools s 6∈ S˜ listed in P ki with sPis˜.
Suppose ϕ = γ. Since ϕ(Qi, Q˜−i) ∈ NW (Qi, Q˜−i), |ϕ(Qi, Q˜−i)(s)| = qs for all s ∈ S˜.
Clearly, for all s ∈ S˜, i 6∈ ϕ(Qi, Q˜−i)(s). Also, for all s, t ∈ S˜ with s 6= t, ϕ(Qi, Q˜−i)(s) ∩
ϕ(Qi, Q˜−i)(t) = ∅. So we can define for j ∈ I\i,
Q′j :=
{
s if j ∈ ϕ(Qi, Q˜−i)(s) for some s ∈ S˜,
∅ otherwise.
By the assumption that ϕ = γ, ϕ(Qi, Q˜−i) ∈ S(Qi, Q˜−i). Hence, fs(j) < fs(i) for all
s ∈ S˜ and all j ∈ ϕ(Qi, Q˜−i)(s). From ϕ(Qi, Q′−i) ∈ S(Qi, Q′−i) and the definition of Q′−i,
ϕ(Qi, Q
′
−i)(i) = s˜. Similarly, ϕ(P
k
i , Q
′
−i)(i) = s
∗. By definition of s∗, ϕ(P ki , Q
′
−i)(i) =
s∗Pis˜ = ϕ(Qi, Q′−i)(i), which completes the proof for the case ϕ = γ.
Suppose ϕ = τ . For any s ∈ S˜ define Is as the set of students j that are assigned a
seat through a cycle (in the TTC algorithm) of which school s is part and such that s
points to j. Formally,
Is :=
{
j ∈ I : e
(
(Qi, Q˜−i), σ[(Qi, Q˜−i), j], s
)
= j ∈ P
(
(Qi, Q˜−i), σ[(Qi, Q˜−i), j], s
)}
.
From Observation B.1 and sQis˜ = ϕ(Qi, Q˜−i)(i) for all s ∈ S˜ it follows that for all s ∈ S˜,
i 6∈ Is and |Is| = qs. Also, for all s, t ∈ S˜ with s 6= t, Is ∩ It = ∅. So we can define for
j ∈ I\i,
Q′j :=
{
s if j ∈ Is for some s ∈ S˜,
∅ otherwise.
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Since sQis˜ = ϕ(Qi, Q˜−i)(i) for all s ∈ S˜ it follows that fs(j) < fs(i) for all s ∈ S˜ and all
j ∈ Is. From the definition of Q′−i and the TTC algorithm, ϕ(Qi, Q′−i)(i) = s˜. Similarly,
ϕ(P ki , Q
′
−i)(i) = s
∗, which completes the case ϕ = τ and hence the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 8.5 By definition of the DA algorithm, |M(γ(P k))| ≤ |M(γ(P ))|.
We complete the proof by showing that if i ∈ M(γ(P )), then γ(P k)Riγ(P ). (Since
γ(P ) ∈ IR(P ), γ(P k)(i) ∈ S. Hence, i ∈M(γ(P k)). But then M(γ(P k)) =M(γ(P )).)
Let i ∈M(γ(P )). Denote s := γ(P )(i) ∈ S. Suppose to the contrary that sPiγ(P k)(i).
Let Q′i := s. By Lemma A.1, γ(Q
′
i, P−i)(i) = s. By a result of Gale and Sotomayor
(1985b, Theorem 2) extended to the college admissions model (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990,
Theorem 5.34), Q′i ranks γ(Q
′
i, P
k
−i)(i) weakly higher than γ(Q
′
i, P−i)(i). So, γ(Q
′
i, P
k
−i)(i) =
s, contradicting the assumption that P k ∈ E(P, k). So, γ(P k)(i)Ris = γ(P )(i). ¥
Proof of Proposition 8.6 In Example 8.3, γ(P ) = {{i1, s1}, {i2, s3}, {i3, s2}} and
τ(P ) = {{i1, s1}, {i3, s3}, {i2}, {s2}}. So, |M(τ(P ))| = 2 < 3 = |M(γ(P ))|.
In Example 8.4, γ(P ) = {{i2, s3}, {i3, s2}, {i1}, {s1}} and τ(P ) = {{i1, s2}, {i2, s3},
{i3, s1}}. So, |M(τ(P ))| = 3 > 2 = |M(γ(P ))|. ¥
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